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We consider a noncooperative N-person discounted Markov game with a metric 
state space, and define the total expected discounted gain. Under some conditions 
imposed on the objects in the game system, we prove that our game system has an 
equilibrium point and each player has his equilibrium strategy. Moreover in the 
case of a nondiscounted game, the total expected gain up to a finite time can be 
obtained, and we define the long-run expected average gain. Thus if we impose a 
further assumption for the objects besides the conditions in the case of the 
discounted game, then it is proved that the equilibrium point exists in the 
nondiscounted Markov game. The technique for proving the nondiscounted case is 
essentially to modify the objects of the game so that they become objects of a 
modified Markov game with a discounted factor which has an equilibrium point in 
addition to the equilibrium point of the discounted game. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper may be regarded as a continuation of the work of [ 10, 111, 
where the state space is countable. We now consider the state space as an 
arbitrary metric space. Our game system is formulated and described in 
Section 2. We study the optimization problem for the game system with a 
discount factor so that each player has a maximal total expected discounted 
gain, and so we prove that there exists an equilibrium point in our game 
system. To this end, in Section 4 we introduce two linear operators T,(E) and 
A@) induced from the solution of an integro-differential equation (see Feller 
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[6, p. 4901) such that {7’,(C)} plays a one-parameter (time parameter) 
semigroup of (co) contraction operators and A@) is similar to an 
infinitesimal operator of {T,(C)}. Using A@) as well as the relations with 
T,(J), we define a new creative operator (not linear) on a Banach space in 
Section 5. It can be shown that this new operator has a unique fixed point. 
We then apply Ky Fan’s fixed point theorem to prove the existence theorem 
of an equilibrium point in the discounted Markov game (Theorem 1). 
It is interesting that the structure in the proof of the equilibrium point of 
the game system with a discount factor is applicable to the nondiscounted 
game. Here we define the long-run expected average gain (see the definition 
in Section 2), and the optimization problem is also to find an equilibrium 
point in which every player has a maximal long-run expected average gain in 
the nondiscounted game. The method used in the study of the nondiscounted 
game is new. We describe this method in Section 6, and we prove that the 
nondiscounted Markov game has a constant-gain-valued function in which 
all players have equilibrium strategies that form an equilibrium point of the 
game system. All of our game systems are discussed from the viewpoint of 
functional analysis. 
2. FORMULATION FOR AN N-PERSON GAME WITH A METRIC STATE SPACE 
An N-person (noncooperative) Markov game with a discount factor is 
given by a set of 2N + 4 objects: 
(&A’, A* ,..., AN, p, q, r’, r2 ,..., rN, a). (1) 
Here, S is a metric space, called the state space of the game; 
A’ is the action space of the ith player, i E N = { 1, 2,..., N], the player set 
(throughout each, A’ is assumed to be a compact metric space); 
p is a positive function p(s, h) defined on S x A with s E S and 
d =t (a ‘, a’,..., aN)EA2n~zV=1Ai; 
q is a probability measure q(. ] s, 6) defined on the Bore1 measurable space 
(S, 9(S)) for s E S and d E A given, where 9(S) is the Bore1 field of the 
metric space S; 
ri is the reward rate function of the ith player, i E N (it is a real-valued 
function defined on S x A); 
a is a positive number, namely, the discount factor of the game system. 
If the discount factor a = 0, the Markov game of (1) is then given by the 
2N + 3 objects 
(S, A ‘? A ’ ,..., AN, P, q, r’, r*,..., p) 
and is called an N-person Markov game without a discount factor. 
(2) 
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In order to explain our game system, we give some interpretation for a 
noncooperative N-person Markov game as follows. 
For any time t E [0, co), all players observe the variable state of the game 
system and classify it to one possible state s, E S (which is determined from 
a stochastic process {X(t)}) at time t. All players then choose their actions tit 
under some probability &, without any collaboration with the other players. 
When the multiaction 6, E A is chosen at this state s, E S, each player i E N 
gains a reward rf(st, a;). In this case the state s, may be preserved by some 
probability P(s, = st, t < Its,, &) depending on a positive function p(s,, Es,). 
Such a probability P (sI = s,, t Q IIs,, &) decreases as I increases, and then 
the process moves to a new state stC at the moment ’ > t which is governed 
by a jump probability q(s,, Is(, 6J associated with a Markov process 
St = Sk' t<R<t' 
------- 
PkL = St I St’ 11,) 
r i - (s , a t t) 
FIGURE 1 
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Then the entire process of the game system is repeated from the new state s,, 
(cf. Fig. 1). 
In this type of game system, we will find an existence theorem in which 
each player has his maximal total expected gain in the game system with a 
discount factor. If the game system lacks a discount factor, we define a long- 
run expected average gain for each player and we will find also that each 
player has his maximal long-run expected average gain so that all players 
have their optimal strategies. 
In a game system, a strategy should, logically, be described as a function 
which maps information from past history up to the present state of the 
game process into the action space carried by each player. Precisely, it is a 
mapping from a state space into a probability measure space. Such a 
probability measure measures the actions chosen by all the players. 
Henceforth, a strategy of a player will mean that a mapping maps from the 
state space S into a probability space P(A) art nr=, P(A ‘), where P(A i, is the 
set of all probability measures on the Bore1 measurable space (A i, 9(A i)) for 
each player i E N. 
A strategy ,u’ is said to be stationary if it is independent of the past history 
of the game process and dependent only on the present state, and we denote 
by xi = [P(A’)]’ the collection of all stationary strategies for the ith player. 
For simplicity, we write P(A’) instead of [P(A’)]’ as the stationary strategy 
space for player i E N. Throughout this paper, we assume that each player 
uses only the stationary strategy. 
We now give elementary definitions in game theory as follows. 
Suppose that the game process starts from an initial state s E S, and the 
multistrategy ji =t @ ‘, p* ,...,,uN) is chosen by the N players. Then, in our 
game system with a discount factor a, the total expected iscounted gain of 
the ith player is defined by 
-(LfE~[ri(sf,&)~so =s] dt (3) 
where E,(+ ]sO = s) denotes the expectation with respect to a transition 
probability P(t, e Is, ,Li) related to the initial state s and a multistrategy 
,U E P(A); that is, 
ri(x, &) P(t, dx 1 s, P) 
i 
dt 
dt. 
Here s, E S and a; E A are respectively the state and the multiaction of the 
game process at the time t. In this game process, every player i wishes to 
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choose his strategy p”’ E x’ such that he can obtain a maximal expected gain 
&(s,@ for a given initial state s. Thus there exists a multistrategy ,u= 
@‘,$,..., jP) satisfying 
(4) 
where (u’, ui) 2 (,u’ ,..., pi-‘, r$,,~*+‘,..., cl”), i = 1, 2 ,..., N. This multistrategy 
F= @W ,..,, ,u”) is called an equilibrium point and each strategy ,U~ is called 
the equilibrium (or optimal) strategy of the ith player (i E N). 
For the game with the nondiscounted factor (a = 0), the total expected 
gain of the ith player up to time T is defined by 
(5) 
where the initial state s E S is given and the multistrategy ,U E P(A) is 
chosen. 
The long-run expected average gain of the ith player is defined by 
c$(s, ,a) = ;“, f - qO’(s, 7’3 P). (6) + 
An equilibrium point and an equilibrium strategy of each player in the 
nondiscounted Markov game are defined analogously to the case of a 
discount factor in which oh(s,,E) is replaced by #(s,,C). 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
Additional notation, required for a later context, is given here for the 
reader’s convenience. 
The multistrategy, or, equivalently, the probability measure, is denoted by 
/i = (u1,p2,..., #UN) E fi P(A’) s P(A), (7) 
i=l 
which depends on the given state s E S where A = ny=, A’. We use N = 
{ 1, 2,..., NJ as the player set and 
i= {jEN, j# i}. 
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For each i E N, the strategy pi E P(A’) distinguishes 
,d = (p’)...) pi- ‘, pi+ ’ )...) (UN) E n P(A’), (8) 
jti 
which is employed by all players except the ith player. Thus the 
multistrategy can be decomposed as follows, 
ii = tg, g) E rI P(A~) x P(A~), 
jti 
(9) 
and if u” E P(A’) then 
(pi, d)= (p’)...) ,u-‘,ai,pi+‘)...) ,iP)E P(A). (9’) 
Since each action space A’ is assumed to be compact metrizable, it is 
separable and then the space C(A’) of all real-valued continuous functions on 
A’ is a separable Banach space in the supremum norm topology. We denote 
the dual space of C(A’) by M(A’), which is characterized by a regular 
bounded measure space on (A’, A?@‘)). The probability space P(A’) is a 
closed unit sphere of M(A’) in the weak topology induced from C(A ‘) 
topology. It is known that P(A ‘) is metrized if and only if C(A ‘) is separable 
(cf. Dunford and Schwartz [2, V.5.1, Theorem 11). Hence P(A’) is a 
metrizable compact convex subset of M(A’), so is separable. We denote this 
by M(A)=~;=,M(A’). 
In order to establish that the game systems (1) and (2) possess respec- 
tively the equilibrium points, the following assumptions are cited. 
641) ti) P( T 1 s a is a Bore1 measurable function on s E S for a E A, it is 
continuous on a E A for s E S, and there exists a constant A4 > 0 such that 
0 < p(s, a) < M for all (s, 6) E S x A. (10) 
(ii) q(- (s, 5) is a probability measure on the Bore1 measure space 
(S, 9(S)) when (s, a) E S x A is given. Further, if d E A and A E .0(S), 
then q(A ) ., G) is a Bore1 measurable function on S;,if A E 9(S) and s E S, 
then q(A Is, s) is a continuous function on A. For any A E .59(S), s E S, 
a E A, the function q satisfies the conditions 
o<d~ls,q< 1 
d{s\ls,q=o 
q(Sls, a) = 1. 
(11) 
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(A2) For each i E N, ri(s, &) is Bore1 measurable on s E S for an ~7 E A, 
and is continuous on dE A for a s E S. Furthermore, ri is bounded on 
S x A; that is, there is a K > 0 such that 
Denote 
and 
rys, jq = i, rys, 5) ajqcr). (14) 
Note that Q(& s, ,U) and ri(s, ,U) are both multilinear in ,L? = @I,..., pN); that 
is, for any reals 0, q and any i E N, we have 
Q(A, s, tj& fi’ + vu’)) 
= OQ(A, s, C,u’, v’)) + tlQ(A s, tj& 0’)) 
rys, (u^Bv’ + so’)) 
= &‘(s, (d-, vi)) + qr’(s, (d, d)). 
From (Al), it is obvious that 
4. TRANSITION PROBABILITY FUNCTION AND INFINITESIMAL GENERATOR 
OF A SEMIGROUP OPERATOR 
We use the same arguments as those of Feller [6 ] but use p(s, #) and 
Q(/i, s, ,U)/p(s, p) instead of p(t, s) and II@, s, li), respectively, in the integro- 
differential equation of Feller [6, p. 490, (8)] with t > t = 0. Thus we obtain 
an integro-differential equation in our theory as follows, 
-$(tJ I&PI = -I, P(&ioW, Ws,P) 
(16) 
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with an initial condition 
P(O,nIs,~)=qs,~) for all ,ii (17) 
where 
6(s, A) = 
1 if sEA 
0 if s@A. 
If A = {s}, then Q({s},s,&= 0 and (16) becomes 
-$(t, {s)Js,P)=-p(s,P)P(t, {s}Is,P) 
so that 
P(t, {s}Is,p)= exp{-tp(s,P)l > 0 
for all s E S and t E [0, co). In general, (16) has a unique solution 
P(t, A 1 s, p) such that 
for some measurable set A c S, and it possesses the following properties: for 
any is E fV), 
(1) mAls,fi) is absolutely continuous on t when s E S and 
A E qs), 
(2) W,~ls,$ is Bore1 measurable in s E S when t E (0, co) and 
A E qn 
(3) P(t, A Js, p) is a probability measure on (S, A?(S)) when t E [0, co) 
and s E S. 
Furthermore, it can be shown that there exists (cf. [ 161) a Markov process 
{X(t,,Z); t E [0, co)} in the state space S corresponding to the solution 
P(t, A Is, p), a probability distribution, for which X(t + t,, ,G) = x belongs to a 
subset A c S at time t + t, where X(t,,,Z) = s, t, E [0, co). From this view- 
point, the solution P(t, A Is, ,U) is also called the transition probability from s 
into A with respect o the Markov process {X(t,p): t E [0, co)}. 
Let B(S) be the set of all bounded, Bore1 measurable, real-valued functions 
on S. Now for a multistrategy p E P(A) at the moment t E [0, co), we 
introduce two bounded linear operators 7’,(E) and A@) of B(S) -+ B(S) 
which are defined respectively by 
Tt@) 4s) = I, u(x) WY dxIw4 (18) 
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and 
(19) 
By using the properties of the transition probability P(t, A ) s, ,0), one sees 
easily that T,(J) satisfies the conditions 
(Tl) I’fl 7’,(G) u(s) = 7’,(Z) u(s) = u(s) (20) 
(T2) Tt,@) Tt2@) 4s) = Tt,+JA u(s); (21) 
that is, {T,(Q)); t E [0, co)} is a one-parameter ((C,) contraction) semigroup 
of bounded linear operators on B(S) associated with the transition 
probability P(t, A Is, /7) or, equivalently, with the Markov process {X(t, 0)}. 
The relations between 7’,(E) and A@) are given by the following lemmas, 
which are immediate by the general theory on semigroup operators. 
LEMMA 1. For any multistrategy p = (,ul,..., p”) E P(A) and u E B(S), 
the operators T,(U) and A@) satisfy the equation 
ProoJ: Since P(t, A 1 s, ,ii) is absolutely continuous in t, by (18), we have 
f T,@) u(s) = j u(x) $66 hl s,P>. (23) 
s 
Using (16), (23) becomes 
= 
5 
u(x)(-p(x, ji)) P(t, dxl 4 
S 
+ 
1 I 
s u(x) Q(dx, Y, F) W, a!! 1st PI s 
= 
ij S 
-p(x, ,q u(x) + ( u(y) Q(& x, #I Ptb d4 sv fl) 
s I 
(by interchanging x and Y) 
= T,(C) A@) u(s). 
This proves (23). 1 
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From Lemma 1, we see that A(,@ plays an infinitesimal generator of the 
semigroup {T,(D); t E [0, oo)}. 
LEMMA 2. For p E P(A) and u E B(S), we have 
U(s) = I” e-“’ Tl@)(al -A@)) u(s) dt 
0 
(24) 
and 
T,(i) u(s) = etA%(x) for tE [O, co) (25) 
where a is the discount factor in the game system (1) and I is the identity 
operator on B(S). 
Proof: Formula (24) follows directly from the elementary calculation 
I 
a, 
epa’7’,@)(aZ -A@)) u(s) dt 
0 
= ae -a’Tt(C) u(s) -e-“’ f T,(,E) u(s)! dt 
(by applying Lemma 1) 
I *d =-- o 2 k-“‘W3 WI 
= ToWI 4s) 
= u(s). 
Formula (25) follows directly from (22). Thus the proof is complete. 1 
5. THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN 
A DISCOUNTED MARKOV GAME 
For each i E N and a multistrategy ji E P(A), we define an operator 
T’@): B(S) -+ B(S) by 
p(p) u(s) = 2 + &(I+$) u(s) (26) 
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where a is the discount factor, M is the constant of (10) in (Al), and I is the 
identity operator. Then from (Al), (13), and (19), for any U, v E B(S) we get 
I( Tyii)u - T’(E))u 11 Q g-pll. 
Hence T’(U) is a contraction mapping on B(S), a Banach space with norm 
IIuJl= supsss lu(s)l. By the Banach fixed point theorem, there exists a unique 
fixed point, namely, ai@)), satisfying the identity 
(27) 
where u’@)(s) is the function value of u’(U) at s E S. Let M + a multiply 
(27). We then obtain 
au’@)(s) = ri(s, /7) + A (ii) u’@)(s) (28) 
or 
(a1 - A (ii)) u’@)(s) = ri(s, fl). (28’) 
Inserting (28’) into the right-hand side of (24) in Lemma 2, it follows that 
u’@)(s) = 1” e-a’Tt@) ri(s, ,U) dt 
0 
(29) 
where #(s,p) E B(S) for any p E P(A). By (A2) and (14), we see that 
#(s,,U) is bounded on S x P(A), and it follows directly from (29) and (18) 
that 
II e@l < K/a 
for all p E P(A). By (29), the following lemma is immediate. 
(30) 
LEMMA 3. For any s E S and i E N, u’@)(s) is continuous on p E P(A). 
Proof. By (A2) and (14), #(s,,U) is bounded on S X P(A) and is 
continuous on P(A) for each s E S. From (13), Q(A, s, ji) is continuous on 
P(A) and so Av) is continuous on P(A) by its definition (19). It follows 
that, by (25), 7’,(E) #(s,p) = etAtiT) *r (s,p) is continuous on P(A) uniformly 
for t E [0, co). Hence u’w) in the representation (29) is continuous on 
P(A). I 
In order to show the existence of an equilibrium point in the game system 
(l), we introduce an operator 
f(2) d?(S) + B(S) 
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defined by 
M 
+- 
M+a ( 
I + Aoll4 
M (31) 
for u E B(S), where fi E P(A) is given, a is the discount factor, and M is the 
constant in (A 1). As the definition of (26), the {. } on the right-hand side of 
(31) is written by T’(,u’, 0’) U(S), and so @‘) can be written as 
27$j u(s) = rnOy I+(#, ~7’) U(S). (32) 
Mutatis mutandis, it is shown, as for T’(E), that P(,u’) is a contraction; that 
is, for any U, v E B(S), 
and hence ?(,u’) has a unique fixed point u(u’) in B(S). Thus 
zd#)(s) = m:x Ti(.ui, I+) u@‘)(s) 
= Qlij u(pi)(s). 
Analogous to (28), the expression (33) is reduced to 
au(ui)(s) = my{r’(s, (u’, a’)) + A(#, ~7’) u(u’)(s)}. 
(33) 
(34) 
To simplify for any u E B(S), we let 
L’(d”, a’) u(s) = ri(s, (pi, a’)) + A(@-, ui) u(s). 
Since T’(u’, a’) is continuous on P(A), so is L’(ui, ui). The following lemma 
is essential for the existence of an equilibrium point. 
LEMMA 4. For each i E N, there exists a multistrategy & E P(A) such 
that 
L’&) u(s) = m:x L’(u$, u’) u(s). (35) 
Proof. Since every action space A i is a compact metric space, the 
probability measure space P(A ‘) is metrized as a compact convex subset of 
M(A ‘). Thus P(A) = I-I;= 1 P(A ‘) is a compacet convex metrizable space and 
thus is separable. 
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Now for each i E N, and any s E S, we define a point-to-set mapping 
Gf : P(A) -i ZPtAi) 
Gf@) = {A’ E P(A’) 1 mUax L’(,D~, a’) U(S) 
= L’(d”, 1’) u(s)}. (36) 
Evidently G&i) is nonempty closed since L’(,u’, oi) U(S) is continuous on the 
compact space P(A), and so such a maximum is attained. Further, Gf(,ii) is 
convex for ,U E P(A) since L’(,u’, a’) u(s) is concave (linear) with respect o 
ci. We write 
G&I) = fi G;(i). 
i=l 
Then G,(2) is a convex closed nonempty subset of P(A). Here if we can 
prove that G, is upper semicontinuous then by Ky Fan’s fixed point theorem 
[3], there exists &, E G,&). Further we must show that this ,u,, is in P(A), 
that is, show that cl0 is a Bore1 measurable mapping from S into P(A) 
defining a multistrategy, so that the proof will be complete. 
We proceed with these proofs as follows. 
First, we show that G, is upper semicontinuous. To this end, let {&} be a 
sequence in P(A) such that ,iik +,&, as k-+ co and choose 1, E G@,J such 
that 1, + 1,. Then 
(37) 
Let 6= (u’,..., a”) be an arbitrary element of G,&,). By the continuity of 
L’@‘“, oi) U(S) on P(A), for the sequence {&} in P(A), we get 
lim L’(ui, 0’) u(s) = L’tjdk, a’) u(s). 
k-m 
But when 2, E GJ,iZk), it is obvious that 
L’(& a’) u(s) < L’c& n:> u(s). 
Letting k-, co, we obtain 
Lvp;;, a’) u(s) < L’c& n;> u(s). (38) 
Since dE G,(&), the inequality (38) must be an equality. Hence (37) holds. 
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From this fact (the upper semicontinuity of G,), there exists a fixed point 
&, E G,&) (cf. Fan [3]). This means that for any s E S, and each i E N, 
Next we show that this ,& is 9(S) measurable. Since L ‘(~6, a’) u(s) is 
continuous in ui E P(A’) and P(A’ is separable, it follows that for any real c, 
{s]m:x L’(ai, a’) u(s) < c} = ,?,, (slL’@~, ~7’) u(s) < c} 
t 
is a measurable set where Ti is a countable dense subset of &I’). Hence 
Lib;, a’) U(S) is measurable with respect to the Bore1 field 9(S). Conse- 
quently, from Lemma 1 of Benei [ 11, we see that there exists a Bore1 
measurable map ,u!+ from S into P(A’) such that 
m~Li@6,0i)u(s)=L’@~,p$)u(s). 
Since L’(ub, a’) U(S) is concave (linear) in ui E P(A’) and its maximum is 
attained by ,u; for each i E N, thus if we replace ~16 by ,u;, we get 
rn$x L ‘(p$, a’) u(s) = L $T*) u(s) for any s E S. 
Therefore the proof is complete. I 
By the above preparations, we come to one of our main theorems, 
THEOREM 1. Under (Al) and (A2), the noncooperative N-person 
discounted Markov game (1) has an equilibrium point, so that each player 
has his optimal (equilibrium) strategy. 
ProoJ From (34) and Lemma 4, we have a multistrategy & such that 
au(&)(s) = m:x L’(ui, a’) u(&)(s) (39) 
for each i E N and s E S. Equation (39) is called an optimal equation in the 
discounted Markov game. Thus (39) implies 
au(u~)(s) > L’(j&) a’) u(j&)(s) for any ui E P(A’); 
that is, 
au(&)(s) 2 ri(s, (L&, a’)) + A(&, 0’) u(f&)(s) 
or 
[a1 - A@$, a’)] u@:)(s) > ri(s, (ai, a’)). (40) 
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Inserting (40) into the right-hand side of (24) in Lemma 2 with z+$) and 
C,&, c*) instead of u and fi, respectively, we have 
u(&)(s) 2 Jam e-“’ 7yJg ) a’) ?J(s, @I$) d)) dt 
= &(s, (pi ) a’)). (41) 
We have shown the continuity of u’@) on P(A) in Lemma 3 or equivalently 
(29), and it follows that &(s, 015, ui)) is also continuous on P(A). Since 
P(A) is compact with respect to the induced topology, the supremum 
supDi oL(s, (,&, ui)) is attained such that 
4/&>(s) = sup &(s, (S 9 a’)) 
0i 
= d(s9 P*) (42) 
for each i E N and any given initial state s E S. Hence the proof is 
complete. I 
6. THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT 
IN A NONDISCOUNTED MARKOV GAME 
Throughout this section, we further conditions in addition to the 
assumptions (Al), (i) and (ii), for the function p(s, 6) and the probability 
measure q(. 1 s, G); that is, 
(Al ‘) Besides (Al) we assume that 
(i’) there exists a number /I > 0 such that 
0 <P<P(S,@<M for all (s, 6) E S X A ; 
(ii’) there exist some state s,, E S and a number 0 < y < 1 such that 
q(ls,J Is, a) > Y > 0 for s#sO, for all 6EA. 
It should be noted that from (A 1 ‘), the unique solution P(t, /i 1 s, ji) of (16) 
for any fl E P(A) is honest; that is, for each s E S and t E [0, co), 
P@, Sls,jq = 1. 
Under these conditions, we define a new function j(s, a) and a new 
probability measure Q(. 1 s, a) as follows, 
jqs, 5) = I PCS, El - PY for s#sO, PCS, 7 El for s = s0 ’ (43) 
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and for any /i E 9(S), 
for s # s, and s,, CZ A, (44) 
where /I and y are given in (Al ‘). Then d(s, 6) satisfies (Al ‘), (i’), because 
0 < F(s, ti) < M. On the other hand, ~&4 )s, ti) satisfies the following: 
1. If sfs,, s,&A, then 
< P(S, 4 - PY 
F(s, fi) 
= 1 
(since /i c S - {so}) 
(by (Al ‘), (ii’)) 
(by (Al’), (0 
(by (43)). 
2. If s # sO, s0 E /i, then 
(by (Al’)). 
Therefore in either case, 0 < i(A (s, E) < 1, which is a probability measure on 
(S, 9(S)) and satisfies (Al), (ii). 
Next, let us consider the modr@ed Murkou game as follows, 
(&A’ ,... ,AN, fi, G, r’,..., p, PY), (2’) 
with a discount factor /?r instead of a in (1). This modified Markov game 
satisfies assumptions (Al) and (A2). By Lemma 4 and (34), there exists a 
multistrategy ,& E P(A) such that the value function u(,u~) E B(S) satisfies 
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where 
and 
If s # sO, (45) is rewritten as 
Pyz&S)(s) = my{+ tf&,oi)) -$(s, O&,4 d&>(s) 
= m:x I, {ri(s, ti) -j((s, 6) u(&)(s) 
+ I s u~‘*)(x>p’(s, 4 q(dx)s, 6)) d@S 9u’)(d) 
(by (46) and (47)) 
+ i s di4Jtx)P(& 4 ddxls, @I a.&, dm 
+ PruOlk)(s) - Pra4aJ (by (44)). (48) 
Here the second equality of (48) is expressed as 
so it becomes the last equality of (48). Therefore by adding 
PYa&(so) -PruOlS)(s) 
to both sides of (48) and by using the notation (19), we get 
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If s = sO, it is obvious that 
Pv4pS)(so) = m~~x{r’(so, Cui, 4) + AolS, 0’) 4&)(so)l. (50) 
With the above preparations, we can prove our second main theorem as 
follows. 
THEOREM 2. Under (Al ‘) and (A2), the noncooperative N-person 
nondiscounted Markov game (2) has an equilibrium point and each player 
has his optimal (equilibrium) strategy. 
Proof. Let g(j&) = /Iy~@~)(s,,). By (49) and (50), it follows that 
gc4) z L’olS 3 ui) d&)(s) 
for all s E S and any oi E P(A’); that is, 
g@i) > ri(s, (4, d)) + Al&, a’) z&J(s). (51) 
By the positivity of Tt defined in (18), we can use a linear operator 
T,@$ , a’) of a one-parameter semigroup acting on both sides of (5 1) which 
possesses the same inequality sign. Furthermore, by using the honest 
property induced from (Al ‘), (i’), we arrive at the inequality 
d&J Z T,@i, a’) ri(s, (us, 0’)) 
+ T,l,&, u’) A&, ui) u(d+J(s). (52) 
Then, using (22) for T&i, a’) A@$, ui) in (52) and integrating both sides 
of (52) with respect o time t from 0 to T < 00, we have 
Md-) >I T,oli, ui) ri(s, f,ui, ui)) dt 
+ TT@i 3 U') UC&$)(S) - U@~)(S). 
Dividing by T and then letting T-r CO, we obtain the superior limit as 
follows: 
=iGi rp’(s, T, t&t, ui)) 
T-tCO T 
= ds, tj& ) a’)). (53) 
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Similarly, at the point ,&, it follows from (49) and (50) that we arrive at a 
limit 
g(&) = lim As, T, iJ*> 
T-toO T 
= CPTS, L-i*) for any s E S. (54) 
By (53) and (54), for any initial state s E S and each player i E IV, we obtain 
the optimal value function 
q+(s, &) = m:x f&s, (~5, ~7~)). 
The point ,& is then an equilibrium point. Hence the proof of this theorem is 
complete. I 
Remark. Note that the equilibrium point ,ii* in the modified discounted 
Markov game (2’) is the same as the equilibrium point in the original game 
(2) without the discount factor. 
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